講座名稱：No Training Hurdles: Fast Training-Agnostic Attacks to Infer Your Typing

講座人：劉堯 副教授

講座時(shí)間：12月1日21:00

講座地點(diǎn)：騰訊會(huì)議直播（會(huì)議ID：174 533 274）

講座人介紹：

劉堯，南佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)與工程系的副教授，研究重點(diǎn)是設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)施防御方法，以保護(hù)新興的移動(dòng)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)不受對(duì)手的破壞，曾在網(wǎng)絡(luò)和安全會(huì)議的組織和技術(shù)計(jì)劃委員會(huì)中任職，包括NDSS，CCS，INFOCOM，S＆P和CNS。 她還是學(xué)術(shù)期刊的編輯委員會(huì)成員，包括《Jornal of Computer Security》和《 IEEETransactions on Information Forensics and Security》。 于2019年獲得ACM SIGSAC頒發(fā)的ACM CCS Test-of-Time獎(jiǎng)，于2016年獲得NSF CAREER獎(jiǎng)。 

講座內(nèi)容：

Traditional methods to eavesdrop keystrokes leverage some malware installed in a target computer to record the keystrokes for an adversary. Existing research work has identified a new class of attacks that can eavesdrop the keystrokes in a non-invasive way without infecting the target computer to install a malware. The common idea is that pressing a key of a keyboard can cause a unique and subtle environmental change, which can be captured and analyzed by the eavesdropper to learn the keystrokes. For these attacks, however, a training phase must be accomplished to establish the relationship between an observed environmental change and the action of pressing a specific key. This significantly limits the impact and practicality of these attacks. Recently, we discover that it is possible to design keystroke eavesdropping attacks without requiring the training phase. To eavesdrop keystrokes, an attacker can establish a mapping between typing each letter and its respective environmental change by exploiting the correlation among observed changes and known structures of dictionary words. This talk will introduce this new attack and the experiment results.

主辦單位：通信工程學(xué)院